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The 2014-2015 H1N1 outbreak in India has reportedly led to 800 fatalities. The reported influenza hemagglu-
tinin sequences from India indicate that these viruses contain amino acid changes linked to enhanced viru-
lence and are potentially antigenically distinct from the current vaccine containing 2009 (Cal0709) H1N1 viral
hemagglutinin.Between 2009 and 2010, the 2009 pan-
demic influenza A H1N1 (2009pdmH1N1)
virus is estimated to have caused over
18,300 deaths across 74 countries
worldwide (Cheng et al., 2012). Since
the initial pandemic outbreak, the
2009pdmH1N1 has replaced the prior
seasonal H1N1 and established itself in
the human population. This is largely due
to sequence evolution of the hemaggluti-
nin (HA) protein, whose activity critically
governs the receptor binding, fusion,
and transmission properties of the virus
(Smith et al., 2009).
Influenza activity in the northern
hemisphere has been high this year, pre-
dominantly due to influenza A(H3N2).
Further, antigenic analyses of the recent
circulating A(H3N2) viruses have shown
differences from the A(H3N2) virus used
in the influenza vaccines for 2014–2015.
However, some countries in Northern
Africa, Middle East, and notably India re-
ported an increase in influenza A(H1N1)
pdm09 activity. It has been reported
that the recent 2014–2015 H1N1 outbreak
in India has resulted in >8,000 cases
with over 800 deaths, although it remains
unclear if there is an underestimation
of the number of real cases. Anecdotal
reports indicate that the majority of
these cases involve young adults—a
trend that is similar to the 1918 Spanish
Flu pandemic, when 50–100 million
people died worldwide. One recent
news report from India indicates that
influenza genes sequenced from patient
swab samples revealed no newmutations
in the virus (http://indianexpress.com/
article/cities/pune/silver-lining-no-mutation-
of-h1n1-says-study/). Additionally, it wassuggested the 2009pdmH1N1 pandemic
strain—A/California/04/2009—was
responsible for the outbreak in India.
Continuous surveillance of influenza
viruses enables researchers to track
viral evolution, identify amino acid
mutations in key viral proteins governing
their circulation, predict potential ‘‘out-
breaks,’’ and assist in the development
of various ‘‘outreach’’ approaches to treat
as well as prevent further spread. Typi-
cally, influenza-genome data collected
from field studies or research efforts
are sequenced and submitted to Gen-
Bank and/or one or more specialized
open-access databases. Open-access
databases such as National Center
for Biotechnology Information (NCBI)
Influenza Virus Resource (http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genomes/FLU/FLU.html),
Influenza Research Database (http://
www.fludb.org/), and EpiFlu (http://
platform.gisaid.org/epi3/start) facilitate
sharing of viral genome sequences and
encourage collaborative research world
over. In addition to providing access to
nucleotide and amino acid sequences,
these specialized databases provide
researchers additional information such
as genetic markers (e.g., drug resistance,
increased virulence, etc.) and form the
basis of epidemiological and clinical
data and tools for analyzing the
genomic sequences, e.g., sequence
comparison and alignment, phylogeny
tree construction, epitope prediction,
and mapping. An analysis of the publicly
available influenza databases suggests
that influenza monitoring has not yet
reached sufficient levels to enable real-
time surveillance.Cell Host & Microbe 1Overall, there exist 15,173 H1N1 pdm
HA sequences in the public sequence
databases, out of which 4,213 represent
full-length, nonredundant entries. Exami-
nation of the geography of the isolated
strains shows that the majority of the
deposited influenza sequences come
from the United States (38.4%), China
(7.2%), United Kingdom (6.5%), and
Singapore (6%). Unfortunately, India
ranks low (14th) in this list, contributing
less than 1.5% of sequences. Further-
more, despite the vastness of the Indian
subcontinent, only two sequences have
been deposited during 2014–2015 from
India, suggesting poor surveillance and
potentially limiting the response to a
deadly outbreak. Additionally, swine can
also contribute to the emergence of
novel H1N1 variants through the process
of reverse zoonoses and thus should
also be monitored. Despite the risk
posed by these animals, the number of
swine influenza sequences collected in
the 2009–2015 period is insignificant,
with notably no swine influenza strains
deposited from India. These numbers
highlight the irregular, reactive nature of
the influenza surveillance response.
Although there are limited Indian-origin
influenza sequences available in the
public database to make any causal
inference on the perceived increased
fatalities in India, examination of the
2014 Indian H1N1 HA sequences shows
traits with potential cause for concern.
Amino acid changes in specific positions
in the receptor binding site (RBS) of
2009pdmH1N1 have been shown to
impact glycan RBS specificity and have
been linked to increased virulence and7, March 11, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 279
Figure 1. Phylogenetic Tree of 1,000 Representative H1N1 HA Amino Acid Sequences
Belonging to the 2009 pdm Lineage Generated by Neighbor Joining Method
Due to the sheer density of nodes and branches, only a handful of strains are labeled (by strain name and
subtype). Clades are defined based on high bootstrap confidence values (>70%) at every node. Branches
corresponding to the Indian H1N1 strains are highlighted in green. Scale bar indicates the number of
nucleotide substitutions per site. The vast majority of the strains in clades I–III were isolated between
2009 and 2013, whereas the strains in clades IV and V were isolated between 2010 and 2015. The Indian
H1N1 strains are clustered in clades IV and V except for a single strain that is part of clade II.
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the Indian-origin strain A/India/6427/
2014 contains amino acid changes
T200A and D225N compared to the
2009pdmH1N1 pandemic strain. The
T200A amino acid change has been
shown to improve human glycan recep-
tor-binding of 2009pdmH1N1 HA (Xu
et al., 2012b). The D225N mutation has
been linked to increased virulence and
disease severity in patients infected by
the 2009 pdm virus (Ruggiero et al.,280 Cell Host & Microbe 17, March 11, 20152013). Importantly, a previous study
showed that the D225N mutation in the
context of H1 HA affected receptor bind-
ing and also decreased susceptibility
to NA inhibitors (McKimm-Breschkin
et al., 2013). It should be noted that the
D225N mutation was previously linked
to serious illness resulting in hospitali-
zation or death (L’vov et al., 2010). The
high population density in India, ease
of person-to-person transmission, and
lack of effective treatment options createª2015 Elsevier Inc.ample opportunities for this variant to
sustain and become dominant. It is un-
known if the strain A/India/6427/2014 is
still in circulation; however, the apparent
severity of the current outbreak seems
to suggest that it could be.
Gene reassortment wherein segments
of the genome are exchanged between
different strains is another mechanism
that drives rapid influenza evolution.
Indeed, the previous three pandemics
emerged as a result of gene reassort-
ment. The 1957 H2N2 (Asian flu) pan-
demic emerged through reassortment
between human H1N1 and avian H2N2.
Similarly, the H3N2 (Hong Kong) pan-
demic was caused by a human-adapted
H2N2 virus as it obtained avian H3
and PB1 genes through reassortment.
The 2009 swine-origin H1N1 pandemic
emerged as a result of reassortment be-
tween avian, human, and swine influenza
viruses. India houses billions of farmed
birds and swine animals across the
country. Combined with this, export of
animals and challenges to farming
infrastructure augment the risk of reas-
sortment events. Although the 2014
Indian-origin strains appear to have
not undergone reassortment, the involve-
ment of gene reassortment in the
current outbreak in India cannot be deter-
mined without full genome sequence
information.
Since 2009, HAs of the 2009pdmH1N1
lineage have gradually evolved (Figure 1)
and acquired mutations in the H1 anti-
genic sites (Sa, Sb, Ca, and Cb) (Caton
et al., 1982). Notably, strains carrying
seven antigenic-site mutations appeared
in 2013, which has implications for re-
evaluation of the H1N1 vaccine compo-
nent (A/California/04/2009). Importantly,
the mutation K166Q at the ‘‘Sa’’ antigenic
site discriminated strains that circulated
before 2013 from those that circulated
during 2014–2015. While the majority
of strains that circulated before 2013
possessed Lys at 169, >80% of the
strains that circulated after 2013,
including the two 2014 Indian isolates,
possessed a Gln. Importantly, a previous
study showed that a variation at 166
could lead to escape from neutraliz-
ing antibodies elicited by the current
H1N1 vaccine component A/California/
07/2009 (Linderman et al., 2014). Addi-
tionally, while the antigenic residues
N129 (Sa), G158 (Sa), and N159 (Sb)
Figure 2. Three-Dimensional X-Ray Crystal Structure of Trimeric
HA1 Globular Head of A/California/04/2009 in Complex with Human
Receptor LSTc
The view of the trimer is along axis perpendicular to 3-fold symmetry axis
(Xu et al., 2012a) (PDB ID code 3UBE). The antigenic sites Sa, Sb, Ca, and
Cb are colored blue, red, magenta, and green, respectively. The human re-
ceptor is represented in a stick format in tint color. The approximate locations
of the antigenic sites mentioned in the text are marked on the structure.
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relatively lower, fluctuating
frequencies before 2013,
they continually increased in
frequency and became more
dominant after 2013. Impor-
tantly, the noted antigenic
residues may also exert an
influence on the receptor
binding property of the HA
due to their close proximity
to the RBS (Figure 2). In sum-
mary, the set of mutations
that characterize the 2014
Indian strain are K166Q,
T200A, and D225N. Addition-
ally, as noted above, anti-
genic residues (N129, G158,
and N159) are also important
HA changes observed in
the 2014 Indian-origin HA.
These extensive amino acid
changes observed in 2014
Indian influenza HA contra-
dict the recent reports by
Indian news media on a
lack of mutations observed
in the H1N1 viruses in India.Given the global reach of influenza,
there is an urgent need to develop a
comprehensive and at least somewhat
standardized response to influenza
epidemic outbreaks. Authorities and
health officials should document out-
breaks with limited delays. As was the
casewith the H7N9 outbreak, there needs
to be genetic and phenotypic analysis of
the virus and general dissemination of
the data to ensure access to real-time in-
formation. For many strains, only the HA
gene is sequenced, leaving the rest of
the genome incomplete. This is because
many of these efforts are part of research
studies that focus on receptor binding or
immune response. Additionally, the cost
of sequencing is still prohibitively expen-
sive for many. All the above factors pose
challenges for real-time surveillance.
In the context of various outreach
toward slowing or halting an epidemic
outbreak, access to both antivirals and
vaccines plays a large part; thus a priority
should be development of infrastructure
to make, store, and distribute appropriate
countermeasures. In this case, stockpil-
ing of antivirals for targeted administration
can buy time to allow for a widespread
vaccination campaign. Additionally, the
development of a universal vaccine cango a long way in mitigating the risk of
high mortality.
One response to epidemic outbreaks
is to identify vaccine strategies to abbre-
viate the time lag between advent of a
novel virus strain and the manufacture
of vaccine, such as through synthetic
approaches (Dormitzer et al., 2013) or
use of alternative vaccine formats, such
as virus-like particles (Fries et al., 2013).
An alternative approach may be through
targeted use of prophylactic antivirals.
Modeling of such an approach for
malaria has indicated that judicious use
of artemisinin can affect spread (Peak
et al., 2015). Similar epidemiological
modeling of influenza epidemic outbreaks
may allow for such strategies, such as
potentially targeting high-risk populations
such as health care workers with a pro-
phylactic long-lived antiviral to possibly
mute outbreaks, allowing time for imple-
mentation of vaccine strategies.
Even in the event of the absence of a
successful vaccination strategy or the
development of resistance to neuramini-
dase inhibitors, the use of antibody to treat
influenza has some clinical experience to
support efficacy. For example, a recent
study evaluated the use of convalescent
plasma in 93 patients with H1N1 2009Cell Host & Microbe 17, March 11influenza in Hong Kong (Hung
et al., 2011) In this prospective
multicenter case control study,
patients with severe influenza
who were hospitalized and
required intensive care unit
support were recruited and
offered convalescent plasma
containing influenza-neutral-
izing antibody in addition to
the standard of care with a
neuraminidase inhibitor, either
oseltamivir or zanamivir. Mor-
tality was significantly lower in
the treatment groups who
received convalescent plasma
compared to the controls
(20.0% versus 54.8%, p =
0.01). To this end, there have
been several reports of broadly
neutralizing antibodies for
influenza, which clearly neutra-
lize influenza virus in vitro, pro-
vide complete protection after
a single administration in vivo,
and protect against multiple
strains of influenza (Corti
et al., 2011; Ekiert et al., 2009).In summary, the influenza outbreak
in India should be further examined to
determine the virulence and potential
threat of the virus. Improved surveillance
and monitoring of the influenza outbreak
will significantly enhance the options of
how best we can manage outreach to
both treat as well as prevent spread of
the virus.
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